Edited by Csaba Békés and Anna Locher

Speech by First Secretary of HSWP (János Kádár) at the HSWP Political Committee Meeting on the Initiative of the GDR Leadership to Summon the Meeting of the PCC

17 November 1964

Comrade János Kádár:

Let us decide that we endorse the convocation of the meeting and express our opinion concerning the date and the participants. I believe it is proper that the meeting will be held in Warsaw.

Please, prepare a draft concerning the position of Hungary. It is not to be a harangue presented at a rally but the expression of the Hungarian position in three pages. For at the meeting we will have to stand up and make clear the standpoint of the Hungarian government. Or let us prepare a modifying proposal to the one that has been distributed, which is based on the present discussion. The committee should then take a look at this material.

Besides, we would also need another document, on the basis of which we could initiate consultations with the Soviet government in order to coordinate our positions in advance.

The multilateral nuclear force must be viewed as it is assessed by the Soviet government. The essence of it can be summarized in three things: the basic balance of power will not be changed – and this means something; it increases the tension in international relations; and it provides a reason for the West for provocation. And it not only increases international tension, but also entails the danger of war. There is of course a fourth aspect here, which is not made explicit, namely that it would greatly enhance the international importance of the FRG.

And what is the goal of this meeting? Well, first it is to show that the Warsaw? Treaty is alive. I dare to say this because in those days it was we who raised this proposal. Why should we struggle separately? We have to give and opportunity to discuss the situation. And then, it seems now that there are two positions: there is a public call, which addresses partly the governments and partly the public, and secondly, the people involved should be given the proper instructions. This is the goal of the meeting.

On whom do we want to put pressure? On the imperialists, partly in a direct fashion, partly through their own public opinion. But we also have to make sure that we do not make them develop a sense of solidarity. Maybe we are not putting pressure on them in the right way. And there are things in which they are unified.

In my view several questions can be raised internally. I even suggest that we should tell the Soviet Union, simply and openly, that we are concerned with this thing that there are various ideas over here and we would like to make them clear to them. And in this confidential letter of consultation we could raise a number of things, and maybe some of these should be discussed at the meeting. But I repeat, we should not let our opponents to develop a sense of solidarity among them, while raising tension at the same time among ourselves.

Here is the issue of the peace treaty. It might mean bringing us to the verge of a war, for we might come to a point where we are between the devil and the deep blue sea.? There are the American, the French and the

Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP)

Hungary and the Warsaw Pact, 1954–1989 Edited by Csaba Békés and Anna Locher November 2003 www.isn.ethz.ch/php

English troops there, aren't they? And if they say they do not accept it and beat us down in their tanks, then we will have to open fire. And they will also fire.

And there is another problem with the peace treaty too. Who will sign it? Fine, the Soviet Union will sign a peace treaty with the GDR, but there are others too, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and I could go on. Let us think this matter over! Are these countries all going to sign a peace treaty? If the Warsaw Treaty is not unified on this issue, then terrible things might happen. I do not even know whether Albania is or is not a belligerent country, and how about Yugoslavia? Is Albania also going to sign the treaty? They will not even be present at the meeting.

In our reply letter we should tell the German comrades that we are looking at the matter, we should write to them frankly and in a comrade-like fashion what sort of questions have been raised with respect to the peace treaty, etc. And we might even raise the point why Albania is not invited to attend the meeting. It is a member state of the Warsaw Treaty. We should propose the invitation but not emphatically, however, we might as well raise the question. Of course if they are also present there, then we have to negotiate in a different way that when they are not. So we should send a separate letter of consultation through our party lines on these issues. I ask you to entrust Comrades Kállai, Nemes and myself with approving this letter as well as with approving the reply letter and the Hungarian position.

[Translation by Andreas Bocz]
