Proposal by Minister of National Defense (Lajos Czinege) to the HSWP Political Committee re: the Hungarian Position on the Command System of the UAF

18 January 1966

App. No 2 to 0096/HPAGS 1st Group Commandership – No 1966

ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT

TOP SECRET

Made in: 30 copies

<u>Proposal</u>

concerning the command system of the Unified Armed Forces to be made at the [forthcoming] meeting of the ministers of national defense of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty

In order to further improve on the command of the Unified Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty the agreement must ensure that – taking into account the sovereignty of the member states – a more effective harmonization of their military efforts in the following areas:

1. In times of peace:

- a uniform assessment of the military-political and strategic situation and the expected activity of NATO;

- coordinated planning of military operations of the armed forces;
- coordination of a well-balanced and systematic development of the armed forces ;

- standardization of the structure of the armed forces and of the principles of military operations and strategy;

- coordinated development of the armament system and the harmonization of the development and production of military technology;

- establishment of a unified system of military preparedness of the armed forces and the effective dislocation of the troops;

- a unified system of requirements for the training of the commanders, staffs and troops, and regular training in the cooperation between the armed forces of the member states;

- necessary standardization of the regulations concerning the preparation of the seat of military operations in the territory of the member states, the mobilization of the armed forces, the provision of material supplies, etc.;

- coordination of the research work in the field of military sciences and generalization of the scientific results;

- supervision of the implementation of the rules and regulations made jointly by the member states.

Copyright 1999-2006 Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP). All rights reserved

If cited, quoted, translated, or reproduced, acknowledgement of any document's origin must be made as follows: "Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), www.isn.ethz.ch/php, by permission of the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich and the National Security Archive at the George Washington University on behalf of the PHP network."

2. In time of war:

- effective utilization of all the available military resources;

- effective and coordinated reconnaissance of the enemy;
- a unified command of the air defense systems of the member states;
- a unified command of the military operations in the European seat of operations;
- maintaining constant cooperation among the armed forces of the member states;
- mutual assistance in supplying the forces with material and technological resources, in

sanitary provision, in the transportation and mobilization of troops and in telecommunications.

II.

Today the command system of the Unified Armed Forces cannot yet meet all the above requirements in every respect and in many ways fails to reflect the changes that have taken place in the course of the development of the Unified Armed Forces. Therefore, with a view to further improvement, the following matters must be clarified:

- questions concerning the legal status of the leading military organs of the member states and the Supreme Command and their relationship;

- the interpretation of the structure, the mechanism and the methods of the command;

- the structural conditions of improving the command system.

Considering that the problems concerning the command system of the Unified Armed Forces have already been raised by some member states at various international meetings, the January 1965 meeting of the Political Consultative Committee commissioned the supreme commander of the Unified Armed Forces to work out a proposal together with the ministers of national defense of the member states which aims at improving the command system and establishing its adequate structure.

At the moment neither the ideas of the Supreme Command nor those of the other states are known. At the same time we do not have mature views on some aspects of the problem either (for instance on the coalition command system of the armed forces in time of war). With a view to this we have requested authorization from the Politburo to represent the following position as a starting point at the next preparatory meeting – with the intention to endorse the ideas that are the most desirable in our view.

In order to turn the Supreme Command of the Unified Armed Forces (henceforth SCUAF) into a truly collective body of military command, to ensure real participation of the member states in the command of the troops belonging to the Warsaw Treaty, and to regulate the relationship between the SCUAF and the high military command of the member states, the following regulations must be implemented:

1. A collective military command body must be established working under the guidance of the Political Consultative Committee which is capable of making adequate military proposals to the Political Consultative Committee and based on the Committee's decision it can take the necessary practical measures, discuss and make the practical regulations which bring under control the development, the strategic use, the military training and the material and technological supply of the Unified Armed Forces.

Copyright 1999-2006 Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP). All rights reserved If cited, quoted, translated, or reproduced, acknowledgement of any document's origin must be made as follows: "Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), www.isn.ethz.ch/php, by permission of the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich and the National Security Archive at the George Washington University on behalf of the PHP network."

With a view to this goal the highest military body of the Warsaw Treaty, the "Military High Council" must be established, consisting in the ministers of national defense of the member states, the chiefs of staff, the supreme commander and the chief of staff.

2. The Supreme Command of the Unified Armed Forces must be transformed in a way that it should be able to accomplish the following tasks in time of peace:

- make strategic plans for the use of troops under its jurisdiction;

- work out the requirements for military operations and training, coordinate and supervise training, and plan and conduct joint military maneuvers;

- coordinate the war supplies of troops;
- develop modern military technology;
- coordinate work concerning command (telecommunications, ciphering), and any other activities requiring joint command and coordination.

The Supreme Command should direct the training of the troops deployed in the Unified Armed Forces for the prevention of aggression indirectly through the ministries of national defense (staffs) of the member states and supervise them in cooperation with them.

Based on the resolutions, decisions and requirements of the Military High Council the Supreme Command works out the necessary plans and directives for the troops deployed in the UAF, issues the necessary orders the execution of which is then insured by the respective ministers of national defense in their own jurisdiction in accordance with the adopted resolutions. The definition of concrete rules and regulations to be implemented with a view to meeting the requirements falls to the share of the military command of the member states.

<u>In time of war</u> the Supreme Command must be capable of accomplishing all the tasks assigned to it by the Political Consultative Committee and the Military High Command. The full elaboration of the wartime military command system requires further work.

ххх

The organization of the Supreme Command must include: the supreme commander, his deputies, and the joint staff working under the supreme commander.

a. The supreme commander of the Unified Armed Forces must be a person who does not fulfill any function in his own national army.

b. Deputies must be appointed to assist the supreme commander who should represent the military leadership of the member states, instead of the presently common practice that the ministers of defense of the member states are at the same time the deputies of the supreme commander, thus, in a military sense, his subordinates.

c. The unified staff must be a working team – not subordinated to the military leadership of the member states - consisting of generals and officers delegated by the member states of the

Copyright 1999-2006 Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP). All rights reserved If cited, quoted, translated, or reproduced, acknowledgement of any document's origin must be made as follows: "Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), www.isn.ethz.ch/php, by permission of the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich and the National Security Archive at the George Washington University on behalf of the PHP network."

Warsaw Treaty. The staff must be equipped with an organization which ensures a smooth transition from peace time activity to wartime operation.

3. The Organizational Rules and Regulations of the "Military High Council of the Warsaw Treaty" must be worked out which should lay down its scope of authority and specific tasks in accordance with the above considerations.

Budapest, January 18, 1966.

Czinege Lajos

[Translation by Andreas Bocz]

Copyright 1999-2006 Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP). All rights reserved If cited, quoted, translated, or reproduced, acknowledgement of any document's origin must be made as follows: "Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), www.isn.ethz.ch/php, by permission of the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich and the National Security Archive at the George Washington University on behalf of the PHP network."