
**Joint memorandum of the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of National Defense
on the future of the Warsaw Treaty,**

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Foreign Ministry – Ministry of National Defense

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Actual Questions Relating to the Future of the Warsaw Treaty

I.

I. Our Interests

The Warsaw Treaty has fulfilled, and continues to fulfill, its main objective: it guarantees peace and security for its members.

The WT (Warsaw Treaty) is the crucial factor of our geopolitical situation. It is a political reality (primarily deriving from the fact that our country is adjacent to the Soviet Union), which has been inextricably involved in the international developments following the end of the Second World War.

In case of an extensive European conflict directed partly against Hungary, or of a threat to the same effect, the WT offers coalitional military guarantees, in which our chief ally, the Soviet Union, has massive deterrent and counter-striking capabilities that cannot be warded off.

At the time of its formation, but also during the period of the so-called "Brezhnev doctrine" later on, the Warsaw Treaty offered a number of specific international guarantees for the communist parties to retain political power and to defend the social status quo in the member states against radical changes, both internal and external, that could threaten the prevailing socialist order.

In consequence of our membership, we are able to rely on our neighboring countries, which, with the exception of neutral Austria and nonaligned Yugoslavia, are members of the same organization, thus guaranteeing that general tensions and differences of opinion will be handled within a controlled framework. Our allied status makes our immediate environment's reactions to current affairs more predictable, at the same time demanding loyalty and a more tolerant attitude from us.

Our membership implies continuous consultation with the Soviet Union on all the essential issues concerning European and worldwide security, which is crucial in orienting our actions. Due to our allied status, more

information, and more ways to access information, is available to us both in the WT countries and in the friendly third-world countries.

Our participation in a defense coalition permits us to maintain a smaller armed force, while cooperation and standardization in arms production are major economic considerations.

The WT's commitment to European security has, from the start, opened up broader prospects for us to participate in the formation of European politics, lending wider basis and greater import to our initiatives.

The various platforms of the WT served as additional forums for the leadership of our People's Republic to elucidate our views to our partners and, if necessary, to exercise correctional criticism towards the Soviet leadership.

2. Changes

With the politics of confrontation gradually becoming unworkable in international relations, and with cooperation becoming increasingly common in the relationship between the opposing social systems, the economic means of getting the upper hand and gaining in influence have come to the fore, while the course of confrontation has by and large been replaced by the option of economic rivalry. This has led to a decline in the relative importance of the military/political coalition's main functions.

In consequence of the present détente, and parallel with the easing of military confrontation and the growing of trust, the priority of politics, of cooperation, has become unequivocal. The military factor has gradually been relegated to the background within the WT, also, while the political aspects have come to the fore. The achievements of the Helsinki process, along with the expansion of the political sphere, have added to the agenda some questions regarding the modernization of the mechanisms of political cooperation in the relationship between the member states, also.

The image of the enemy has also been changing. Due to the proliferation of the global problems, the ideological doctrines of foreign politics have been losing importance. While newer and newer forms of cooperation have continuously been devised in the framework of the Helsinki process and in the Soviet-American relations, a similar tendency has still been awaited between the two-military/political blocs.

The truly new dimensions of political cooperation came into view in 1985, following the personal changes at the top of the CPSU. By shifting the focus to universal human values, Soviet foreign politics carried out a U-turn, introducing a new thinking in its foreign policies, which inevitably produced some corrections in the course of the Warsaw Treaty's international politics, at the same time modifying certain norms within the alliance.

The logic of the new foreign policy thinking dictates that, in addition to reducing military confrontation and discussing the issues of disarmament, we dedicate more attention to the tasks that await us in the areas of human rights, humanitarian relations, economic growth and cooperation and ecological security.

In the foreign politics of the Soviet Union, demonstration of solidarity extended to the smallest details is being replaced by a synthesis based on the member states' national interests in foreign politics. The reforms unfolding in the various socialist countries, along with the associated changes in the political

superstructure, naturally have certain consequences in the area of foreign politics, also: the specific national qualities, proclivities and interests are now being firmly asserted. The democratic control and openness of foreign politics is increasing; the division of interests adds more shades and colors to the various societies. The autonomous, sovereign and specifically national foreign policy goals receive more emphasis. The wave of critical re-evaluation that follows in the wake of the reforms has reviewed the foreign policy models of previous periods, the inter-socialist relations of the Stalinist era being no exception.

Perestroika has substantially modified the Soviet Union's relations with the Warsaw Treaty and its member states. While the fundamental requirement expecting the neighboring Eastern-European countries to maintain cordial relations with the Soviet Union has not changed (to which purpose the allied status is the most appropriate form), the content of the relations is changing: as a result of the democratic process, it is complemented with partnership, a mutual respect for the national interests, and the acceptance of an individual course of development. The member states have learned to dispense with the ideological packaging of their foreign policy objectives, with the minute synchronization of their goals. On the Soviet side, there is a growing demand for wide-ranging relations, as well as a growing interest in the member states' specific experiences. Nevertheless, the crucial difference is manifested in the Soviet Union's interest in the success of the reforms.

As a result of the perestroika and the reforms, the dividing line between the opposing viewpoints has also shifted within the Warsaw Treaty. In sharp contrast with the earlier period, when the division ran between the countries toeing the line on Soviet foreign politics on the one hand and Romania emphasizing its separate foreign policy position on the other, now the crucial difference is beginning to emerge between the countries choosing the path of reforms and those either postponing it or rejecting it altogether.

The differences are the least striking in the various countries' approach to disarmament, while they are the most conspicuous in their approach to human rights and humanitarian issues.

3.) The Current Situation

To this day, permanent organizations within the Warsaw Treaty have only been established for military cooperation, while nothing of the kind has been introduced in the sphere of political cooperation. The latter has retained the character of a movement, regardless of the point that the political organizations are functioning on a more regular basis now.

The probable reason why the Warsaw Treaty had no need for a permanent political organization was that in the earlier practice of Soviet foreign politics frequent consultations were redundant; besides, the Romanian foreign politics would not tolerate any more of them anyway.

Most of the energies of the political mechanisms are now being spent on the compilation of documents of a propagandistic nature. There are practically no more internal documents and recommendations prepared by experts for the high executives. The levels of decision-making are concentrated in the hands of the top leaders, which corresponds to the stage of development of political democracy that exists in the member states. The majority of the growing numbers of expert consultations are without a specific commission or mandate; the work carried out here is so removed from the political decisions that it can hardly affect them. As a result, the appeals and statements made by the Political Consultative Committee never exceed the level of political intentions, as they are usually not backed up by a concerted action plan regarding their execution

(the document on the protection of the environment, the document on the new economic world order). On a number of occasions new initiatives have been introduced at the highest level, regardless of the fact that the decision-makers had no detailed information in the subject and possessed only a superficial knowledge about the feasibility of the plan.

Lately it has become increasingly frequent that the joint military organizations release public statements about issues of foreign policy consequence.

Formally, there are (irregular) meetings between the parliamentary representatives of the WT countries, although substantial cooperation is not being done here. A recent development is that on Polish and Soviet initiative the ways of setting up a joint WT inter-parliamentary organization are being explored. The debates about the plan reveal that, in search for an identity, the parliaments of the member states show great interest in external experiences.

II.

The Challenges

Several of the WT countries are in a critical situation, some facing a downright crisis. To allow crisis management in the various countries, the WT must preserve calmness in international relations in such a way that the principle of non-intervention is also observed between the member states and the idea of state sovereignty is not harmed even in the name of defending socialism. The development of international relations dictates that in future the solidarity of the sister parties in critical situations when the socialist establishment is threatened must only take political forms.

Directly or indirectly, the ongoing reforms, or the postponement of reforms, in the various WT countries also touch on the question of political power, effecting the countries' future development; in other words, they have serious consequences to the international status quo. Changing or restructuring political ascendancy in a country, along with the accompanying tensions, may appear extremely "seductive" from the outside, tempting some elements to interfere in other countries' internal affairs by offering summary views, messages and "advice." This will only be conducive to a powerful retrogression, a return to the known ills, rather than to a move forward to overcome the problems.

The political debates generated by reforms and movements, or precisely the lack of them, give rise to anxiety and distrust among the member states of WT, because they usually appear under the veil of "national colors."

The crisis and the reform movements occasionally produce effects that can directly encumber the relations between the allies, relations already weighed down by humanity's global problems.

Today, there is growing distrust in the relations between Poland and the GDR; on top of the Romanians (who, in consequence of their politics, have been worrying about Hungary for a long time), more and more of our allies are watching anxiously the developments both in Hungary and in Poland, while all the members have high hopes, or great concern, for the Soviet perestroika. Amidst the near-crisis conditions, citizens of the WT countries face mounting difficulties in trying to visit another WT country; whether admitted or not, the situation of the national minorities adversely affects the relations between several member states. The economic links between the Warsaw Treaty members are stagnating or declining. Pollution and

environmental hazards are spreading across the borders. We have recently reopened numerous traumatic pages in our region's history.

In the West, the European Economic Community will have entered a more advanced stage of its development by 1992. Its growing economic potential is accompanied by a political integration of a new kind, which is complemented by a converging joint military politics. This carries the potential of further enhancing Europe's division and consolidating the military blocs.

Similarly to the way in which human rights have come to play a key role in East-West relations, acquiring equal status with the handling of the disarmament issues, the same sphere has become the touchstone of Europeanism in the Warsaw Treaty countries.

As the process of political thaw takes its course, the military blocs become more and more anachronistic. The doubts concerning the need for such blocs are on the increase in each of the member states, with the Soviet Union being no exception.

The greatest challenge our foreign politics faces today is the appalling state of the relations between Romania and Hungary, along with the dire situation of Romania's Hungarian minority. So far we have been unable to devise appropriate ways to tackle this problem within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty. At the same time, several of the NATO countries as well as the neutral states are ready to make a stand independently on this issue and to cooperate with us in this respect.

III.

Our Program

The aim of our main national program is to catch up with the developed states of Europe in the framework of a dynamically developing democratic society. This is inseparable from the demand that the Hungarian minority living across the borders enjoy proper human and collective rights. The basic precondition of our program is to develop our capacity to adapt to those norms, which characterize the most developed countries.

The political slogan of the European community will become a doctrinal program only when the norms of European cooperation, the very criteria of the Helsinki process, are observed within the Warsaw Treaty. This means that we must not be satisfied with the minimal agenda currently followed in the Warsaw Treaty, which limits the focus of attention to the preservation of peace and the issues of disarmament. Demonstrating loyalty to such a narrow interpretation of the Warsaw Treaty's international strategy would hardly reflect our sincere interest in changes, besides robbing us of considerable amounts of subsidiary resources.

Our foreign politics will not attain a truly European character, if it sabotages or neglects our national responsibility. Our catch-up with the developed countries will only seem authentic, if we unreservedly assume responsibility for the fate of Romania's Hungarian minority, if accept the burdens of the appalling relations between Hungary and Romania. As before, the handling and the solution of this issue can be envisaged only on a broader basis, in accordance with the European or international norms, which in turn requires our acceptance of an appropriate role in international politics, in East-West relations. It is in our fundamental interest, as far as both domestic and foreign affairs are concerned, that Romania's minority issue should not be seen as a bilateral conflict.

Our program can bank on drawing marked international attention and sympathy. Although we should primarily be concerned with our own future, the fact that Hungary is in the forefront of changes means that the success or failure of our reforms will have a powerful impact on the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

The Hungarian undertaking of the 1980s to act as a bridge between the opposing blocs has now been followed by a program of even greater international importance: this one has pledged to renew socialism in order to bring closer and combine the best features of the two social systems.

Starting out from the factors that most closely affect our region, we must single out and foster the elements that are favorable from the viewpoint of the reforms. This especially applies to the structure of cooperation with the states allied to us. We must transform the Warsaw Treaty into a modern and democratic organization that is compatible with the reforms. We must build guarantees into its structure against the forces of retrogression.

Special, reform-oriented relations must be established with the Soviet Union and Poland. The marked feature of these relations would be the demand for reforms and the mutual reinforcement of reforms in each other's country, rather than the shunning of the rest of the allies. We must work towards transforming our relations with these two countries into the hard core and the driving force of the Warsaw Treaty. Nevertheless, our efforts to maintain good relations with the other member states must not be neglected.

Growing importance is attached in our program to the further improvement of regional security and cooperation, with special regard to our relations with Austria, Yugoslavia, Bavaria, Northern Italy and Czechoslovakia, in which cases the efforts should ultimately lead to a network of agreements, inclusive of the military factor.

We must take into calculation that in the immediate future our maneuvering space will be extremely limited as a result of our dire economic situation, large foreign debts and high degree of dependency. On top of taking appropriate economic measures, we must maintain vigorous and wide-ranging political relations with the West so as to offset our disadvantages. It would be wise to allow some sort of a political/public supervision in the matter of our debts; in any case, the public must have limited access to information regarding the management of the debts.

The main goal of our international political program is to reduce the importance of military blocs, to bring them closer and to integrate them so as to provide collective security.

In proportion to the growing international guarantees, and in consideration of our individual priorities, we must incorporate in our program further elements effecting considerable unilateral reduction in our armed forces, thus reaping the political and economic profits and international advantages that such a move is likely to yield.

IV.

The Proposals Added to the Agenda of Developing the Warsaw Treaty

At both sessions that the advisory committee established at the June session of the WT Political Consultative

Committee has had so far, the member states have been able to expound their positions about the desired course of future political and military cooperation.

Regarding the political sphere, essentially three concepts have been emerging:

The Soviet and Polish delegations press for a marked expansion of the WT's political activities primarily through institutional reforms. This is fairly closely in line with the Bulgarian ideas, which demand to react to the challenges posed mainly by Western Europe's unification by increasing the integration and building a socialist common market with the associated political organizations. It will be these socialist integrative organizations, developed on the pattern of the western integration, which will then establish contact with the corresponding organizations of Western Europe.

Among those who want close cooperation, the main elements of the reform process are beginning to emerge: to add more substance to the work of both the Political Consultative Committee and the Committee of Foreign Ministers; to establish a permanent political body, a secretariat, in order to strengthen the foreign policy integration; to start a careful democratization process in military cooperation; to improve cooperation between legislative bodies - possibly leading to the establishment of a joint parliamentary body.

At the Sophia session of the Political Consultative Committee in October 1985, Comrade Gorbachev proposed the establishment of a permanent political body; this proposal, which was repeatedly made, finally received our approval in principle at the Warsaw session of the Political Consultative Committee in 1988. (We enclose in Appendix 1 the text of the comprehensive Polish proposal made in January 1989. This will probably be submitted to the Bucharest session of the Political Consultative Committee in 1989.)

In stark contrast with the above, the Romanian side recommends the abolition of the Political Consultative Committee in its present form, to be replaced with regular summits attended by the top leaders of all the European socialist countries (i.e. Albania and Yugoslavia included) so as to strengthen the political and economic cooperation outside the framework of the Warsaw Treaty. They reject any moves towards introducing substantial reforms in the existing structure of political cooperation with the claim that this would create a supranational structure and thus would injure the sovereignty of the member states. On the other hand, they support the proposals regarding the democratization of the mechanism of military cooperation, and even add to these their own concrete demands. They propose the establishment of the Military Defense Committee, which would consist of the defense ministers and act as the top organization of military cooperation, the main field of activity of the Warsaw Treaty.

The Romanian proposals are probably rooted in their concern that the socialist reforms, and the member states urging for rapprochement in Europe, will eventually bring the Warsaw Treaty in line with the European norms, with a structure that guarantees the continuous criticism of the Romanians. Their proposals may also be motivated by their desire to create a situation at the Bucharest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, which would allow them to "glorify" their separate course in foreign politics. (In Appendix 2, we enclose a letter written in July 1988 by the Romanian Communist Party's Central Committee, to which they have persistently been demanding an official reaction by the party ever since.)

At the meeting of experts, the Hungarian delegation pressed for substantial improvements in cooperation, attaching secondary importance to the structural problems. We primarily focused on the following:

- The establishment of a Special Committee comprised of Warsaw Treaty deputy ministers to deal with the

issues of human rights and humanitarian relations, as proposed by the Hungarian delegation at the Warsaw meeting of the Political Consultative Committee;

- The extension of the Warsaw Treaty General Secretary's competence in order to improve internal coordination and outward communication;
- The improvement of both the work atmosphere and the debating spirit within the Political Consultative Committee, the Foreign Ministerial and the Defense Ministerial Councils and in the activities of all the work groups in general;
- The realization of the principle of involvedness in decisions where no consensus is possible, so as to allow the presentation of different opinions;
- The introduction of a modern and democratic procedural system;
- The requirement to produce and publish concise and objective documents.

The proposals concerning the military organizations of the Warsaw Treaty have the following features in common: they demand democratization; they want to strengthen the work atmosphere at conferences and meetings; they want to eliminate parallel processes and formalities. In contrast with the Romanian proposal, those wishing to strengthen cooperation concur in the view that progress must be made in the internal organization and modernization of the military organizations, leaving their structure and functions essentially intact. There seems to be an agreement about the requirement that, with the exception of the posts of Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff of the Unified Armed Forces, which would be reserved exclusively for the top military personnel of the Soviet Army, with a time limit of 4 to 6 years on each term, a larger share of the top jobs should be given to the representatives of the other member states; that the representation, responsibilities and roles of the other members should be increased; and that their interests should be better respected on the basis of partnership and in line with the rules of the joint organizations. The debate and the implementation of the proposals about the modernization of the military organizations' operations have been dragging on. The changes effected in the Soviet military command reflect the new thinking and the new type of allied relations only modestly. The proposals of the members seem to agree on the point that the cooperation between the political and the military organizations must be improved and the high-level decisions require better preparation both diplomatically and militarily.

V.

The Course to be Followed

- Hungarian foreign politics firmly supports the extension of the scope and the responsibilities of the activities of the Warsaw Treaty with those European norms that we have pledged to observe in Vienna. We must consistently stand by each principle of Helsinki, especially the ones - i.e. the peoples' right to self-determination, the bona fide compliance with the international obligations, the good relations between states, the observation of human rights and liberties - that the Romanian government tries to evade on the pretext of various excuses. We must publicly expose all such attempts.
- We must firmly insist on keeping the recent Hungarian proposals about the modernization of the Warsaw Treaty on the agenda; these include the following: establishing a Warsaw Treaty Special Committee to deal with human rights and humanitarian cooperation - Hungary should volunteer to coordinate the work of both the committee and the expert teams; adding coordinative functions to the Warsaw Treaty General Secretary's competence; strengthening the internal democratization in the political and military organizations and laying down the associated procedures, which should not be limited to the principle of consensus - the opposing views should be allowed to appear in internal documents and, in a cursory manner, also in public documents;

the mechanism of decision-making should be improved; and in cases when a consensus is lacking, the parties concretely involved should be allowed to pass resolutions that are binding only to themselves.

- We must encourage the work atmosphere and the informal discussions at the meetings.
- We must cut back on formalities at the official functions and promote openness.
- Regarding the work of the teams of experts: in addition to producing documents for the public, they should also draft a growing number of recommendations for the leadership of the member states about the practical aspects of important international issues.
- We must press on with our efforts to make travel easier for citizens between member states.
- Through their activities, the Hungarian teams delegated to the various Warsaw Treaty platforms should work towards having the priority of politics accepted within the organization.

2.

- In the military sphere our aim should be to increase our independence and to play a more active part. In preparing the Political Consultative Committee for formulating its position on issues of international security and disarmament, our efforts should be directed at improving the collective work based on actual facts. We must ensure that the Special Committee on Disarmament works regularly and at a high standard. The level of distrust should be lowered by effecting closer cooperation between the political and the military organizations. No more military documents of foreign policy consequences should be produced without prior consultation with the diplomatic staff, just as no more diplomatic documents should be drafted without the involvement of military experts. All decisions in the military sphere, which bear upon our foreign policy interests, should be made only after consultation with the Foreign Ministry.

- In case of establishing any new military organizations on a permanent basis, the existing budgetary and staff limits should not be exceeded. Simplifications in the military organizations' functioning must be achieved by improvements in work methods and, whenever the actual tasks allow it, by the reduction of staff.

- We should make the suggestion that, by increasing the efficiency of the meetings of the Committee of Defense Ministers and by further improving the work at the High Command and the Staff of the Unified Armed Forces, it would be possible to abolish the Military Council in its present form, after having integrated some its tasks with the tasks of the Committee of Defense Ministers. (The above would not imply that the Commander in Chief - in line with his own plans - could not discuss, in consultation with the people concerned (deputies, top representatives of the armed forces of the member states), various military questions relating to the Unified Armed Forces making recommendations and proposals pending on the actual situation.

- The necessity of having representatives of the Unified Armed Forces' Commander in Chief posted to the armies of the member states should be reviewed.

[...]

- The creation of a political body; this should not be blocked; nevertheless, we should tie it to the realization of our concrete interests, i.e. to the requirement that the issues of human rights and humanitarian cooperation, including the permanent monitoring of the condition in which national minorities' live in each other's country, be resolved in an institutional manner.

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- On the point of a joint parliamentary body: we must make the cooperation between our respective parliaments more organized and more substantial, without actually setting up a permanent joint institution. In the question of inter-parliamentary cooperation, too, we must press for developing the inter-European relations, the establishment of joint European bodies, in the legislative sphere, also.
 - We must give an official reply to the Romanian Communist Party's Central Committee about their proposals aimed at the transformation of the Warsaw Treaty, underscoring the point that the original treaty, along with the organizations that were built on it, has carried out its mission. It would be judicious to complement this structure with such elements that the international developments have required - above else in the areas of human rights, humanitarian cooperation and the planned and institutionalized handling of global and international problems.

7.

- The next meeting of the Political Consultative Committee will be held in Bucharest. Based on the Viennese final act, the Hungarian delegation should submit a draft proposal there, which specifies certain joint obligations concerning the human rights and the rights of national minorities. Our delegation should submit a draft resolution about the establishment of a Warsaw Treaty Special Committee dealing with human rights and humanitarian cooperation, making it clear that we stand by our proposals firmly. Our efforts, or possible failures, must be made public through the appropriate channels.
- On the front of the Foreign Ministers and the Defense Ministers' Committees, we must start planning the establishment of institutionalized relations between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO and begin internal work on the program of reconciliation (centers for reducing danger, joint mechanisms for consultation and information, etc.)
- A workshop within the CFM-CNDM should be set up to analyze the types of bilateral socialist cooperation (Hungarian-Soviet) and European cooperation, which are necessary to guarantee our military security and cooperation for the possibility of simultaneous dismantling the Warsaw Treaty and NATO.
- An inside analysis must be prepared by the CFM-CNDM about the alternatives of a regional cooperation involving Hungary, Austria, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, the FRG and Italy, concerning international security.

Budapest, March 6, 1989.

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