

TOP SECRET!

In defining our mobilisation system, I believe we must start from the following premises:

- 1./ The small size and geographical features of Hungarian territory must be taken into account /:the area between the Danube and the Tisza is flat, which is very suitable for an enemy attack:/;
- 2./ When developing the system of mobilisation, Comrade Stalin's teaching that we live in an age when wars begin not by sending declarations of war but with the commencement of military action must be borne in mind.

These two decisive considerations demand that even prior to the commencement of military action we must arm through concealed mobilisation the first echelon of our battlefield forces, but in my opinion at least 10 divisions, and the necessary supporting units from the different military branches, especially air defence artillery, air forces and artillery units.

In order to enable the country to fully mobilise, it is imperative that the country's southern borders be securely sealed by an adequate military force. We must get ready for solid, stout defence. The 4 standing peacetime rifle divisions are insufficient for this mission. Thus to be able to repel an enemy attack, to stoutly defend our southern borders and to implement mobilisation according to plan, it is absolutely essential to execute concealed mobilisation. This requirement already typifies the nature of our mobilisation system. In other words, our mobilisation system must above all enable concealed mobilisation. I believe any divergence from this would be wrong.

Noting and counting on the dangers and temporary seizure of certain areas along the southern border concomitant with an enemy incursion into Hungarian territory, our mobilisation system and plan must be devised so that all men of military age, including 15-17 year old youths as well, from an approximately 20-30 km deep band between Zalaegerszeg and Makó who will not be called up for the concealed mobilisation be withdrawn from the length and depth of the border zone and concentrated in north-east Hungary.

This is necessary to prevent the enemy taking conscriptable men from temporarily captured territory. If we do not do this, we will lose a force worth a few divisions already at the start of a war, which, considering our small reserve strength, would seriously weaken Hungary's military forces.

In my opinion the mobilisation system should be based on auxiliary headquarters and the conscription of individuals. This system has considerable advantages which we cannot afford not to exploit.

The system's advantages:

- 1./ As already stated, it enables concealed mobilisation;
- 2./ It enables organised mobilisation according to plan at a rapid pace.

The latter is in my opinion a matter of principle of decisive importance. If we organised mobilisation so that conscripts go directly to their units, this would allow conscripts to be called up haphazardously, so to speak, and seriously complicate controlling mobilisation and indeed also slow it down. We have to take into account that our mobilisation will have to take place not just amidst

an enthusiastic defensive spirit /: which we must ensure we generate:/ but at the same time amidst seriously deepening conditions of the class war. The enemy will do everything it can to disrupt the mobilisation, the political awareness of the conscripts will vary greatly and, I believe, there will also be not an inconsiderable number of conscripts who do not want to join up or reluctantly report late to their units. But this is only one side of the coin. The other is that mobilisation will occur in circumstances when the enemy air force has started strategic bombing. Undoubtedly, the enemy will first bomb the railway bridges and junctions to seriously cripple our transport network /: naturally, they will also bomb important cities, factories, etc.:/. If in such a foreseeable situation the draft is not organised, that is the mobilisation does not occur through military auxiliaries, the result will be that a substantial percentage of the conscripts will not join up or only join up late, which would prolong and slow down the pace of mobilisation.

On the other hand, if the auxiliary headquarters call up the conscripts, it can quickly be established there who has reported and who has not, and then the search for those who have not can be speedily arranged.

From the auxiliary HQs, conscripts can be sent to their units faster in difficult transport conditions /: by lorry, cart or on foot:/.

The auxiliary HQs would execute the mobilisation with the appropriate safety margin and thus losses could be replaced. If the mobilisation were founded on a basis that the conscripts go straight to their units, the units would have to have an appropriate /:larger:/ safety margin to implement mobilisation, which would lead to the dissipation of the reserves.

There is also the advantage in a well-devised mobilisation that the reserves are not dissipated but concentrated in the hands of the military HQs and the Ministry of Defence.

Another disadvantage of calling up directly to the units is that it can only be implemented if the unit and town they must report to in case of mobilisation is written on the military service card of all men liable for military service beforehand. This is not desirable in my opinion – indeed it is explicitly dangerous as this would allow spies from the imperialist powers to establish in which towns which units would be formed in case of mobilisation.

Another disadvantage is that HQs where new units need to be established would be burdened with unnecessary administrative work. The new units' HQs must get already established companies, batteries and divisions from the auxiliary HQs, take them over, bring them up to strength, equip them, and discipline and forge them together. This is an onerous task. This division of roles between the auxiliary HQs and the HQs of the new units being established will accelerate mobilisation making it organised and planned.

As regards calling up reserve officers, officers whose task is to take already established units from the auxiliary HQs to the army should be called up to the auxiliary HQs. The other part of the reserve officers who have no such task must directly join the troops.

“A” units must be brought up to strength from the garrison's town or immediate surroundings and thus they can go directly to the troops as well. This, however, is an insignificantly small number.

As regards calling up 1/3 of the reservists to the “A” units and accordingly giving 1/3 of the rank and file, 1/3 of the non-commissioned officers and 1/3 of the officers to the “B” units would be impractical as this would disrupt the “A” units in the execution of their duty. It is common knowledge that the “A” units' task is to occupy their appointed defensive bands within 24 hours and pursuant to the “A” military alert order.

As regards the radio and poster command to mobilise, I believe both are necessary in the sense that when hostilities break out our Party's and people's leader, Comrade Rákosi, must address the people, informing them that the country is in a state of war, defining the aims of the conflict and the people's duties, and speaking among other things of mobilisation and the necessity of everyone reporting exactly and in a disciplined manner as instructed on their draft papers.

A poster issuing the command to mobilise can and should be made in advance.

As regards the Party's duties in relation to mobilisation, I believe that on the basis of the accepted mobilisation measures a narrow Party/military committee should devise this in a proposal for the Party leadership.

SUMMARY: Our mobilisation system must enable rapid, concealed and organised mobilisation according to plan, as this is the only way to guarantee that we will not be caught unexpectedly and unprepared should the international situation turn towards war.

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*[Translated by László Ritter, Budapest]*