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**Note from Romanian Ambassador to Washington (Corneliu Bogdan) on US Comments on the  
PCC Meeting of 2 December 1970**

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- American official and political circles are focusing their attention and special interest on the top-level meeting of the representatives of the Warsaw Treaty member-states due to open soon.

This interest is aroused, first of all, by the assessment that the above-mentioned meeting has been prompted by certain differences of opinion on the West Berlin question between the German Democratic Republic, on the one hand, and the other Warsaw Treaty member-states, mainly the Soviet Union and Poland, on the other.

As a matter of fact, the representatives of above-mentioned socialist countries do not conceal their belief that such differences of view actually exist. The Polish ambassador expressed to me some critical remarks on the recent measures referring to access to West Berlin in retaliation for the meeting of the Christian-democratic Party in that city. He said that such acts add grist to the mill of West German political forces that oppose Chancellor Brandt's détente policy.

- U.S. officials deny that the U.S.A. has hardened its position during the last few months, as the Soviets claim. The American position, according to those officials remained unchanged and its essence is the safeguarding of U.S. rights, confirmed by the post-war understandings on Berlin between the great powers and by implication concerning Germany and Europe. Even if those understandings are obsolete, they may be changed unilaterally. The Soviet Union proposed that the discussions on Berlin should be carried, simultaneously, on two levels: among the four powers, on the general principles of the settlement, and between the West Berlin Senate and the F.R. of Germany on the one hand, and the German Democratic Republic on the other, regarding practical problems (access to and transit in West Berlin). The American side does not understand exactly what principled agreement is being referred to because the USSR has not defined its point of view. Anyway, if it is a matter of principles, the U.S.A. understands that any agreement should reaffirm US rights over Berlin. American representatives admit that a normal reassertion of the US rights and of the four powers in general on the whole of Berlin, would be an unrealistic demand. Therefore, they imply that they would be satisfied by a confirmation of the rights of each of the four powers on their respective zones in Berlin, although the U.S.A. would prefer that this principled agreement be given up and that, at the present stage, the practical question of access and transit be settled. If the USSR is willing and can obtain in this matter some understandings between the two German states and between West Berlin and GDR, this is not the concern of the United States; the U.S. government would not hinder such understandings, but they cannot be binding for or engage the U.S.A. and the U.S.A. cannot participate in them. Therefore, understandings between the great powers are necessary even in the practical questions of transit and access.

Reaffirming this position, the American representatives said that the Erevan statements made by the General Secretary of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, seemed moderate and constructive and they express their hope that the results of the due Warsaw Treaty meeting would be promising for the Berlin question.

At the same time, the press published editorials urging the government to be firm and moderate the West European tendencies to make unilateral concessions to the USSR.

In their talks with us, the American representatives show the same sensitiveness noted during the talks occasioned by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's visit in respect of the criticism that the US uses the Berlin problem as a condition of any progress on the Conference on European Security and Cooperation.

- It is difficult to estimate if any sharpening occurred in U.S. positions as alleged by Soviet representatives. In the formulas used by the American representatives in their talks with us one can note the possibility of a compromise, accompanied by an invitation addressed to the USSR to settle bilaterally this issue. On the other had, we note in the American attitude:
  - A certain concern over the possibility of an evolution in Europe that might slip out of US control, which is conducive to an intensified activity for the reassertion of that control. The American sensitiveness is that much greater as the Berlin question approaches its date of settlement, at a delicate moment for the American-Soviet relationships as a whole.
  - A tactical movement to use to the advantage of the U.S.A. the obvious interests of the USSR in the ratification of the Soviet-West German agreement.

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Translated by Delia Razdolescu]*