

NATO UNCLASSIFIED AND PUBLIC DISCLOSED

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To: ASG for Political Affairs

From: A. Alacakaptan *AA**Belgran Proposal*Subject: Resolution on Future Tasks of the Alliance

The Treaty, signed in 1949, was a collective response to the fear of military aggression by the forces of the USSR and its allies. The forces were of overwhelming strength and examples showed that they were also aggressive. While the fear has been the main urge for the creation of NATO, there was also a feeling among the governments and the peoples concerned that a close association of Atlantic and Western European nations would be conducive to development.

2. These objectives have now been reached. Prospects of a Soviet military aggression against the Treaty Area now seem to have diminished on account of several facts which I will not attempt to repeat and a stage of tremendous development, particularly in the industrialized members of the Alliance, has been achieved. Allies generally believe that ground can be prepared for further reduction, and even ultimate disappearance, of tensions in the Treaty Area. However, some of them show guarded admission that overseas commitments of the United States bear potential dangers for desired peaceful developments in the Treaty Area. This is claimed to motivate the French withdrawal from military integration and this seems to me to have motivated the submission of the resolution we now have before us.

3. Studies to be undertaken under the mandate of the first operative paragraph of the Resolution are likely to denote that developments that have taken place since 1956, and especially after Camp David talks between Khrushchev and former US President Eisenhower have amply shown that nuclear stalemate between the main adversaries has helped diminish the chances of a military confrontation between Soviet Russia and her European Allies and the NATO members in Europe. These studies are also believed to be susceptible of bringing to the surface that, especially after the Chinese acquisition of nuclear capability, United States commitments outside the Treaty Area tend to jeopardize the tranquility in the Treaty's European territory and even risk a total nuclear confrontation. I think the Europeans are generally inclined to forget that capabilities to estimate the adversary's intentions are not infallible. This fact was ably demonstrated by the Cuban missile crisis. Nevertheless, these studies will undoubtedly demonstrate that without the United States and her nuclear deterrent, Western Europe and its institutions will survive as long as the Soviets tolerate it. Therefore, NATO commitments must continue.

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4. However, in the second operative paragraph we see that the Europeans, in spite of their definite desire to keep the United States in an alliance with them, wish to explore means to restrain the fulfillment of American commitments outside the Treaty Area. Hints are made in the last sentence of this paragraph that a "European entity" within the Alliance may be contemplated. The idea which, I think, was first brought up by late President Kennedy might not be a bad one after all. Since practically all other avenues conducive to better political and economic cooperation had been explored in the 1956 Report of the Three Wise Men, this seems to be the only remaining area which needs to be looked into. Would it be in the form of a European Defence Organization or within the nuclear planning and execution bodies these would have to be explored? The European Defence Organization idea which was tabled at the recent NATO Parliamentarians' Conference would require, in addition to a strong will on the part of the Europeans to solidify their tanks, larger resources which the Europeans do not seem to be inclined to provide. However, in the field of nuclear cooperation and responsibility sharing, new areas may emerge for a larger European contribution. Future developments in this field may also have effects on France. Greater cooperation and consultation on nuclear affairs may be accompanied by changes in the status of the North Atlantic Council. The hints provided by Mr. Halvard Lange in his recent article which appeared in the NATO Letter may be worth exploring. Nevertheless, the Europeans, in no event, should try to impose definite checks on the United States foreign policy decisions which may in turn bring about a gradual re-evaluation of United States strategic interests in a manner unfavourable to Europe. To conclude my views on this paragraph, I can say that room exists in the field of nuclear responsibility sharing for a more audible European voice. This will not only lend stimulus to cooperative behaviour but also constitute a guaranty against a martial change in the Soviet policy towards pending European questions to be motivated from the belief of reduced risks of nuclear conflict.

5. Several methods may be employed to implement these studies:

- a) The appropriate Council committee may be assigned to study the national contributions which are indispensable and prepare a committee paper;
- b) A selected group of Permanent Representatives may be assigned to carry out these studies;
- c) An Ad Hoc group may be formed to study these matters.