

NATO SECRET

Handwritten: 2072, Nisen 1052

Handwritten: CAS/67/5 (1-67)

1973

13th January 1967
9-1-03(66) Follow up



To: Secretary General
cc: Deputy Secretary General
Directeur du Cabinet
Mr. Jaenicke (o.r.)
Float
From: Acting ASG for Political Affairs

Subject: Council Resolution on Future Tasks of the Alliance

I submit, herewith, a note on the above mentioned subject prepared by Mr. van Campen who, because of his previous studies on similar exercises, is well qualified to contribute to present thinking on this matter.

2. I am forwarding this paper without comment, but I hope to give you an outline of my own thinking separately. I know that Mr. Jaenicke will also wish to contribute to this general think-exercise.

Handwritten signature

Att:

NATO UNCLASSIFIED AND PUBLIC DISCLOSED

13th January 1967

To: ASG for Political Affairs

From: Special Adviser for Policy Planning

Subject: Council Resolution on Future Tasks of the Alliance

The following is a first effort to define the objectives of the above mentioned Council Resolution and the procedures by which the directive of Ministers might be carried out. Accordingly, the first part of this paper deals with Objectives, the second with procedures. I have deliberately refrained from going into any details, but I am, of course, ready to do so should you or the Secretary General, to whom I hope you will submit this paper, so desire.

I - OBJECTIVES

2. The Council Resolution desires first an analysis of "the political events which have occurred since the Treaty was signed, with a view to ascertaining their influence on international relations and on the Alliance itself". Given the time available, this is a physical and intellectual impossibility.

3. We should therefore accept the principle of selective studies. Given the origins and main mission of the Alliance, the following two come to mind.

4. (a) On the basis of the present military, political, economic and ideological situation of the Soviet Union, and on the principle that the policy of great powers is mainly determined by the objective situation in which they find themselves, we should try and formulate the policies open to the rulers of the Soviet Union, placing ourselves, as it were, in the Kremlin, and adopting their "optique".

(This kind of study has never been undertaken, as far as I know, in NATO. It is radically different from what is generally called "The assessment of the Threat" which is essentially the quest for a compromise formula for what fifteen Westerners subjectively think the threat is. What I therefore advocate is a study not influenced or biased by Western internal considerations.)

- (b) Other external developments affecting the mission and, perhaps, the principles of the Alliance.

Example: The situation in actual and potential crisis-areas outside the NATO area which involve the opposing principles of consultation with commitment and consultation without commitment.

5. These studies are the basis of the real work to be done - the study of "the future tasks which face the Alliance and its procedure for fulfilling them".

6. The two preliminary studies to be undertaken will suggest that either there has been a positive change since 1949 or there has not. In either case, we should study the consequences for NATO

- as regards military strength, military structure (integration) and military strategy
- as regards the structure and the organization of the Alliance. This raises a number of fundamental questions: The issue of sovereignty within the Alliance, the place of Europe within the Alliance (but see, below, para. 8), and the problem of commitments outside the NATO area, in particular with a view to the future of NATO political consultation.

7. If our studies would suggest that a positive change since 1949 has occurred, the question must be studied whether the Alliance continues with new and alternative purposes and, if so, which? (Article 2 of the Treaty; The idea of the Alliance developing into a political clearing house of the Atlantic area.) Do these new purposes require changes in organization and, if so, which?

8. The Council Resolution obviously dictates a study of what might be called "The problem of Europe within the Alliance" - a very delicate problem likely to cause great difficulties. Questions which come to mind in this context are:

What does the 2-pillar concept mean in terms of building up the European "pillar":

- Closer cooperation of the European members of NATO and in which form?
- Establishment of a kind of inner circle?
- Establishment of a form of European defence community?
- The setting-up of a European nuclear power and in which form?
- Would this pre-suppose a European political community with political consultation of its own and, if so, of which "Europe"?
- The feasibility of such political projects given the well-known political attitudes of certain Governments?

II - PROCEDURES

9. In the field of procedures there are, in the history of NATO, various precedents which may prove useful - in particular, the Three Wise Men Report of 1956 and the Long Term Planning Exercise of 1960-61 - for the efficient carrying out of the coming exercise.

10. The first question to decide is whether Permanent Representatives themselves wish to shoulder this burden. In this case, the precedent of the Long Term Planning Exercise of 1960-61 is relevant: its Report was the result of a series of meetings of Ambassadors only with the Secretary General in his private office. It may be doubted, however, whether Permanent Representatives and the Secretary General in addition to their present and manifold duties would find the necessary time to undertake themselves all stages of so large a venture as envisaged by the Council Resolution.


11. If the Council would find it impossible to undertake these duties themselves, it is possible to resort to the procedure of some kind of ad hoc group. In this case the precedent of the Three Wise Men comes to mind but various variations on this theme may be profitably studied. For

example, the term "High political level" used in the Council Resolution would be satisfactorily met if a Committee of Ministers themselves would undertake this exercise. While, however, they have the necessary authority, they are unlikely to have the detailed knowledge, or to find the necessary time. If, on the other hand, experts are utilised, experience shows that while they have detailed knowledge, few have the moral courage to express their thinking with that measure of freedom which this exercise no doubt demands. The best procedure seems, therefore, to employ civil servants who combine detailed knowledge with such assured and high-level positions in their own Governments that they need feel no inhibition in participating in the exchange of frank and perhaps even speculative political and military views. There is a most successful example of this in the history of NATO, namely "The Committee to prepare the NATO Review of Soviet Policy after the Summit Setback" of October 1960; nor should we overlook the Temporary Council Committee of 1951/52.

12. It is obvious that the procedures chosen may vary with the particular object of study or discussion. In fact, a good number of variations can be worked out. In all cases, however, it may be advisable to organise hearings, thus permitting non-Governmental persons or organizations and Parliamentarians to submit such ideas as they may think relevant to the future of the Alliance. Nothing excludes, of course, that such ideas, orally stated, are subsequently confirmed in written submissions. This would have the advantage of profiting from the thoughts and experience of persons and groups who are not tied or inhibited by any official responsibility; it would, at the same time, prevent such people from actively participating in what is, and should remain, a governmental exercise.

13. A useful element in our procedural armoury would be a questionnaire, which might in the first instance be drawn up by the International Secretariat. This was also done by the Three Wise Men of 1956 and proved to be a helpful procedure. What should go into such a questionnaire depends of course upon previous agreement as to the objectives of the whole exercise.

14. Finally, the question of publicity should be examined at a very early stage. If the Belgian proposal was drawn up with an eye to the present state of public opinion, it may be profitable to conduct this exercise in some degree of limelight (the hearings, for example, would be useful in creating the desired impression). Given, however, the uncertainty as to whether the results will be commensurate to our efforts, it might be wise, in case of a more or less public exercise, to avoid raising any undue expectations.


S.I.P. van Campen.